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Using a longitudinal dataset from the years 1995 and 2000, respectively, this 
study examines whether migration within the host country of Sweden generates 
higher total annual income for (two-earner) immigrant families. The empirical 
findings indicate that internal migration generates a positive outcome in terms of 
higher family income for newly arrived refugee-immigrant families. Further, with 
the length of residence in the host country, the monetary gain accruing from 
internal migration decreases. On the other hand, I could not find similar results for 
immigrant families from the Nordic countries, Europe and Asia.  
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1 INTRODUCTION   
This study deals with the economic outcome of internal migration among 
immigrant families in Sweden. Previous studies on the labor market performance 
of immigrants indicate that immigrants’ income/earnings grow with increasing 
residence time in the host country (see Borjas, 1999a, for a survey).
1 This pattern 
is explained by the accumulation of host country-specific human capital such as 
knowledge of the host country’s language (see e.g. Chiswick & Miller, 1995) and 
acquisition of formal education (see e.g. Borjas, 1982; Rooth, 1999). However, 
there is reason to believe that the immigrants’ geographical mobility within the 
host country, i.e. internal migration, is another aspect of importance for their 
income development. This idea constitutes the starting point of the present paper. 
A newly arrived immigrant often lacks relevant knowledge about 
institutional and other characteristics in the host country. This suggests that the 
initial choice of location in the host country need not necessarily be optimal in a 
longer time perspective. For instance, the initial location of residence in the host 
country might not be optimal from the point of view of the skill and/or labor 
market experience of the immigrant. As a consequence, when the immigrant 
learns more about the labor market and/or other institutions in the host country, 
he/she may choose to migrate internally in order to match his/her skills with the 
labor demand. This argument is further strengthened by referring to mobility 
costs: an immigrant who has spent a relatively short time in the host country will 
not yet have built a strong attachment to a specific location.
2  
The aim of this study is to examine whether migration within the host 
country, in this case Sweden, affects the income of immigrants. More specifically, 
the study examines whether internal migration among immigrants generates a 
direct monetary outcome in terms of higher total (disposable) income. I have 
chosen the family as the unit of analysis because the rate of labor market 
participation among men as well as women is fairly high, which implies that 
                                                 
1 See also e.g. Borjas (1985) for a discussion of the methodological issues involved in estimating 
how the time of residence in the host country affects earnings.  
2 See Borjas (2001) for a similar argument. Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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migration decisions are likely to take (at least) two earners into consideration (see 
Mont, 1989). 
Previous studies on internal migration among immigrants focus almost 
exclusively on the determinants of residence location. Bartell (1989), Bartell & 
Koch (1991), Belanger & Rogers (1992), and Zavodny (1999) conclude that 
“ethnic concentration”, i.e. the stock of people with a similar ethnic background, 
is a significant determinant of the US immigrants’ location decisions. On the other 
hand, Buckley (1996), Borjas (1999b), and Dodson (2001) find that newly arrived 
immigrants in general, and refugee-immigrants in particular, tend to live in 
regions with “generous” welfare programs. In the case of Sweden, Rephann & 
Vencatasawmy (2000) show that immigrants tend to migrate to regions with a 
large foreign-born population. Åslund (2001) finds that both the presence of other 
immigrants and the level of ethnic concentration are factors of significance for 
immigrants’ location choices.  
Few studies have found support for the idea that economic motivation plays 
a significant role in immigrants’ location choices. Beenstock (1997) uses Israeli 
data for the years 1969-1972 and finds that during the first three years after 
arrival, job-seeking is the key factor that motivates newly arrived immigrants to 
migrate internally. Thereafter, housing will be the key motivation for internal 
migration. Using data from 1950 to 1990, Borjas (2001) finds that newly arrived 
immigrants tend to live in states where the wage for the skills these immigrants 
have to offer is the highest. Moreover, Borjas’ results indicate that the location 
decision of newly arrived immigrants differs from that of comparable native-born 
citizens and, more important, earlier arrived immigrants. Another study of interest 
is Edin et al. (2003), which suggests that newly arrived immigrants in Sweden 
tend to live in “ethnic enclaves” in metropolitan regions, and that these ethnic 
enclaves generate higher income (up to 4-5 percent), but only for immigrants with 
relatively low income. 
These earlier studies have neither examined the potential outcome in terms 
of the monetary return from internal migration among immigrants, nor have they Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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considered the role of the family in the decision to migrate.
3 Hence, this paper 
contributes by both considering the migration of the family as a whole and by 
examining the direct monetary outcome of internal migration for immigrant 
families.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The theoretical 
framework will be developed in section 2, and in section 3, the empirical analysis, 
including a review of the data, the model, and the estimation method, is presented. 
The estimation results are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2 FRAMEWORK   
The theoretical framework used in this paper is, to a large extent, based on Mincer 
(1978) and Borjas (2001). As noted earlier, the high rates of labor market 
participation among men and women means that most families are composed of 
two earners.
4 Therefore, in this paper, the economic situation of both spouses will 
be considered in terms of a family decision to migrate. Following Mincer (1978), 
the basic assumption is that family migration decisions (internal as well as 
international) are motivated by the maximization of the expected future lifetime 
income
5 for the whole family, and not for the individual members. This implies 
that family migration may take place even though only one spouse gains from the 
move in terms of higher earnings. Mincer (1978) refers to those individuals who 
move (stay), even though it is not gainful for them personally, as tied-mover (tied-
stayer). In these situations, the potential personal losses are assumed to be 
compensated by redistribution within the family.  
                                                 
3 Borjas (1999b) analyzes the choice of residence location among immigrant families. Except that 
his study has a different focus than mine, our studies differ in two important ways. Firstly, Borjas 
only considers individual characteristics associated with the head of the household. Secondly, he 
identifies an immigrant family as such, if the head of the household is an immigrant.  
4 See Mont (1989). 
5 It is important to point out that the general economic analysis of migration is based on the 
assumption that agents maximize net benefits, i.e. the expected stream of benefits net of migratory 
costs is the underlying motivating force for migration (see Sjaastad, 1962). The net benefit, 
however, is not observable for researchers as it includes not only consumption, but also other 
factors, such as leisure. Therefore, it is convenient to follow the convention in Borjas (1985, 1987, 
1999a, 2001) and assume that migration is motivated by income-maximization. Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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We assume that income maximizing immigrant families choose to reside in 
the region where the family expects that its income (or consumption) will be the 
highest. However, newly arrived immigrant families are likely to face problems 
such as language barriers and limited knowledge about institutional and other 
characteristics in the host country, including relevant information about regional 
differences in the host county’s labor market. These types of obstacles decrease 
the likelihood of finding the optimal region upon arrival.
6 However, when the 
immigrant families have overcome those initial obstacles and learnt more about 
the host country’s labor market, they can migrate internally in order to find a more 
suitable location, where the labor market matches their skills best.  
Generally, migration costs are believed to reduce the probability to move. 
Apart from monetary costs related to the move itself, migration is associated with 
other costs, such as the disutility of leaving relatives and friends behind. However, 
newly arrived immigrant families have, by definition, already borne these 
mobility costs (at least) once, and since they have only lived in the host country a 
short time, they presumably have not yet developed a strong attachment to any 
particular region or location. In other words, there is reason to believe that new 
immigrants’ internal migration costs are relatively low, and that this makes it easy 
for them to move. 
The theory discussed above has several implications. Firstly, we may expect 
that families who migrate internally a relatively short time after arrival are likely 
to attain higher total family income, than otherwise comparable families who do 
not migrate. Secondly, we may expect to observe a negative correlation between 
the monetary gain of internal migration and the length of residence in the host 
country. The reason is that immigrant families who have lived in the host country 
for a long time are more likely to have found a good skills match in the labor 
                                                 
6 Note that in Sweden, refugee-immigrants who arrived during the period 1985 to 1989 were not 
free to choose their initial region of residence. Instead, they were directed to regions chosen by 
Swedish authorities. The objective of this policy, which is known as the ”whole of Sweden 
Strategy”, was to allocate the immigrants more equally among different regions in the country and 
facilitate assimilation in general. Although the initial intention was to take the labor market 
situation in the placement regions into account, in practice, the supply of housing deterred the 
selection of some regions (see Edin et al., 2003 for more details). It should be kept in mind that 
this policy could affect the refugee-immigrants’ internal migration decision. However, empirical 
results by Åslund (2001) show that this policy exerted only a weak effect on the refugee-
immigrants’ internal migration probability. Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
5 
market than those who arrived recently. However, it is reasonable to anticipate 
that there may also be a counteracting effect, i.e. a positive correlation between 
the time of residence in the host country and the monetary gain from internal 
migration. The reason is that the longer an immigrant family lives in a particular 
area, the more likely it is to become attached to that location and hence the greater 
will become the cost associated with leaving the area. Thus, as a consequence, the 
size of the monetary outcome required to stimulate the family to migrate 
internally is likely to increase. Hence, because of this possibility, the correlation 
between the monetary gain from internal migration and the length of residence in 
the host country is likely to be nonlinear.  
Moreover, the strength of the effects discussed above may vary between 
immigrant groups. Variations in geographical and cultural distances between 
Sweden and the country of origin may mean that knowledge about the host 
country will vary between different immigrant groups upon arrival. As a result, 
the possible outcome of internal migration is also expected to vary between 
immigrant families from different origins.  
 
3 EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS 
Data  
The empirical analysis is based on the LOUISE-database, supplemented by data 
on internal migration from the Swedish national statistics office, Statistics 
Sweden. LOUISE contains longitudinal individual information on, for example, 
demographic characteristics, income, and education. In addition, for immigrants, 
the database provides information on the world region of birth and the year of 
arrival in Sweden. The data to which I have access are observed at two different 
points in time, 1995 and 2000. The data on internal migration also provides 
current information, by date, on “location changes” for the entire population.  
The dataset used is composed of the total population of immigrants, defined 
as foreign-born people living in Sweden by the 31
st December 1995 and 2000. In 
order to control for possible differences among immigrant groups, I wanted to 
group immigrants according to their country of birth. Unfortunately, the LOUISE Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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dataset, for security reasons, does not provide such information. On the other 
hand, information on the world region of birth is available. Based on this 
information four groups are identified for the purposes of this paper: Nordic, 
European, Asian, and “Refugee” immigrants.
7 Note that “refugees” refer to all 
immigrants who originate from the main refugee-sending countries. 
The sub-sampling process is completed in the following steps; (1) married 
or cohabitant husband-wife families are identified.
8 Families are required to be 
stable, i.e. they should be married or cohabitating both in 1995 and 2000.
9 Note 
that a Nordic immigrant family is identified as such if both spouses were born in 
the Nordic countries and similarly for families from other regions. (2) Families 
with zero disposable income during one period of observation, 1995 or 2000, are 
excluded. (3) As the length of residence in the host country is of significance in 
this analysis, immigrant families with no information on the year of arrival are 
excluded. Moreover, because the income variable is defined on an annual basis, it 
is convenient to include those immigrant families who have lived in Sweden a full 
year (12 months) during 1995. To do so, only families where both spouses have 
arrived in Sweden prior to 1995 are included. (4) For the same reason, families 
who changed location during the years under analysis, i.e. 1995 and/or 2000 are 
excluded as well. (5) In order to minimize the incidence of non-labor related 
migration, families with, at least, one spouse younger than 20 years of age in 
1995, or older than 64 years in 2000, are filtered out. In addition, families where 
at least one spouse is a “full-time” student during 1995 and/or 2000 are also 
excluded. Note that a full-time student is defined as a person who, according to 
LOUISE, receives a study-loan, and who has a disposable income of less than 35 
700 SEK per year.
10 
                                                 
7 Nordic includes Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland. Europe includes all countries in Europe 
except the Nordic countries. Refugee-countries include Iran, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Peru, 
Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey, Chile, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Lebanon, and “Palestine”.  Asia 
includes all Asian countries except those, which are included in the former definition. 
8 Note that cohabitants without common children cannot be linked to each other and hence cannot 
be included in these analyses.  
9 Implicitly, I assume that the migration process itself dose not cause any change in the 
composition of the household, e.g. divorce, which is in line with the majority of existing research. 
10 According to a practice followed by Statistics Sweden, 35 700 SEK (called “basbelopp” and the 
amount refers to the situation in 1995) corresponds, approximately, to three months of 
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According to the data on internal migration, family migration is defined as a 
”change of municipality”. However, our main concern is labor market related 
moves, and labor markets rarely follow the boundaries of administrative units, 
such as municipalities. One way to consider labor market related migration might 
be to use an alternative regional classification, known as labor market areas (LA-
regions). These regions are comprised of neighboring municipalities with 
sufficient commuting opportunities. Moreover, these regions’ boundaries are 
selected in such a way that most people can find both a place to live and a place to 
work.
11 One advantage of using LA-regions as geographical units in the migration 
analysis is that we may limit the inclusion of migration due to reasons other than 
labor market opportunities.
12 However, the weakness with this approach is that we 
will fail to observe migration between municipalities within LA-regions that 
might be labor market related. Another way to consider labor market related 
migration is used in Axelsson & Westerlund (1998), where only relocation at a 
distance of 30 km or more is classified as migration. To summarize, migrants are 
classified as families who during 1996-1999 migrated from one LA-region to 
another and all others are classified as non-migrants. 
The family income variable is defined as the total annual disposable income 
available for consumption and saving after deducting for final taxes from gross 
income and adding tax-free transfers (see Table 1). The income variables are 
expressed in 1995 prices, and the calculations are based on the national consumer 
price index (CPI). As an alternative, I will also try to utilize regional differences 
in consumer prices. Following Axelsson & Westerlund (1998), this is done by 
using a weighted sum of the consumer price index and a regional housing price.
13  
Table 2 compares the mean values of the characteristics of migrant and non-
migrant  families within  different groups. The  table shows  that the proportion of 
                                                 
11 Note that by 1998, Sweden was divided into 100 LA-regions, which will be followed in this 
analysis. For a detailed description of the construction of LA-regions see e.g. Carlsson et al. 
(1993). 
12 LA-region divisions are also used in Rephann & Vencatasawmy (2000) and Eliasson et al. 
(2001). 
13 Our index I for region j at t is calculated as follows;  t t t tj t tj p w w I ) 1 ( ) ( . − + = l l , where w is 
the (national) share of income spent on housing,  j l  denotes the average housing price in region j, 
l  denotes the national average housing price, and p is the national consumer price index (data 
source: Statistics Sweden).  Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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Table 1 Variable  definition 
 
Variable Definition 
INCOME (y)  Family’s annual gross income after deducting for final taxes and adding tax-free 
transfers, i.e. income available for consumption and saving; disposable income. 
M  Dummy variable =1 if family migrate from one LA-region to another during the 
period 1996 to 1999, and zero otherwise.
1  
YSI  The husband’s time of residence in the host country in years. 
AGE  The husband’s age in years.  
EDU  Dummy variables =1 if husband’s and wife’s, respectively, length of schooling 
= 12 years (secondary school), 13,5 years (post-secondary school < 2 years), or 
≥15,7 years (post-secondary school ≥2 years) or more, and zero otherwise. 
The length of schooling of the reference group is between 0 to 9 years.
# 
CHILD   Number of children younger than 15 years living at home. 
EMP  Dummy variable =1 if husband and wife, respectively, were employed during 
the survey week in November, and zero otherwise. 
U  Number of unemployed people at the LA-region of origin
*.
2 
V  Number of vacancies at the LA-region of origin
*.
2 
MOVDEN  The percentage of people who moved into and out of the LA-region of origin
*.
2 
POP  Number of people (in log) living in the LA-region of origin
*.
1 
IMDEN  Share of foreign born people in the LA-region of origin
*.
3 




2) The National Labor Market Board. 
3) LOUISE, Statistics Sweden.
* Refers to 
the region of residence in 1995. 
# These calculations are based on a specific method, which is 




migrant families is greater among refugee-immigrants (10%) and Asian-
immigrants (6,4%) than among immigrants from the Nordic countries (2,3%) and 
Europe (2,6%). Within each group, the initial income level, i.e. in 1995, is lower 
among migrants than among non-migrants, but the income growth for migrants is 
higher than for non-migrants. This is more pronounced in the case of refugee-
immigrants and Asian-immigrants than for the other groups. On the other hand, 
the spouses in the migrant families are younger, have lived in Sweden a shorter 
time, and are employed to a lesser extent than those in the non-migrant families.  
 Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics. 
















  95  249 319  273 684  196 770  237 949  171 737  199 977  175 308  199 197 
  00  273 367  302 552  240 369  287 650  249 098  256 760  236 227  249 903 
) ln(y ∆     0,09 0,10 0,20 0,19 0,37 0,25 0,30 0,23 
AGE   95  47 48 42 46 36 41 37 41 
YSI
  95  18,5  23 11 16 7  11 3  10 
EDU
H  95  10,2 9,5  11,5 11  10,9 10,5 10,7 10,2 
  00  12,5 11,5 14  13  13,4 12,7 13  12,5 
∆  EDU
H    2,3 2  2,5 2  2,5 2,2 2,4 2,2 
EDU
W  95  10  9,7 11,5  11  9,8 9,7 9,3 9,4 
  00  12,2 11,7 14  13  12,8 12,1 11,8 11,6 
∆  EDU
W    2,3 2  2,5 2  3  2,4 2,5 2,2 
EMP
H  95  0,61 0,78 0,61 0,71 0,52 0,64 0,19 0,45 
EMP
W  95  0,56 0,75 0,48 0,65 0,30 0,46 0,10 0,32 
CHILD  95  1,1 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,7 2  2,2 2 
  00  0,9 0,8 1,2 1,1 2  2,1 2,4 2 
U/V   95  0,81 0,83 0,85 0,85 0,86 0,87 0,8  0,8 
  00  2,4 3  2,4 3,1 2,3 3,4 2,0 3 
MOVDEN  95  0,09 0,09 0,087  0,10 0,08 0,10 0,08 0,10 
POP (log)  95  12 12,6  12 13 12,01  13,2  11,6  13 
IMDEN  95  0,11 0,12 0,10 0,13 0,09 0,13 0,08 0,12 
ETHDEN  95  0,05 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,007  0,008  0,03 0,04 
N-OBS.    377 15  852  228 8  457  211 3  066  3  339  28  793 
Share of 
migrants 
 0,023   0,026   0,064   0,10   
 
Note: AGE and YSI refer to the husband. INCOME  is measured in SEK and it is expressed in 1995 prices. 




In order to analyze how internal migration affects immigrants’ income, we may 
apply an extended version of the human capital model, where individual and 
family attributes are taken in account. It is also important that the model allows us 
to control for unobserved time-invariant family-specific and cohort-specific fixed 
effects. Controlling for cohort-effects is essential in order to identify the effect of 
the time of residence in the host country, which is of significance in the present 
study. The reason is that differences in earnings between cohorts who arrived in Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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different years are not only the result of the fact that they differ with respect to the 
time of residence (time-effect). It is also likely that differences in earnings are a 
consequence of differences in unobservable characteristics, such as ability and 
motivation, between different cohorts (cohort-effects).
14 
Thus, an appropriate model may be formulated in terms of the first-
difference between two income equations, one for each point in time.
15 Such an 
income change equation for immigrant family i originating from (world) region j 
may be expressed as follows 
 








j ij j ij j j ij EDU EDU y CHILD y β β δ κ γ 0 ) ln(  
  + + − + − + +
2
0 0 2 0 1
2
0 0 2 0 1 ) ( ) ( j ij j ij j j ij j ij j YSI AGE YSI YSI AGE AGE θ θ τ τ  
  ij j ij j ij j ij j YSI YSI YSI M ε µ µ α + + + − + ] )
2
0 0 2 0 1 ( 1 [  
i =1,…, I  and  j =1,…., J  (1) 
  
where  ) ln( ij y ∆ =  ) ln( ) ln( 0 1 ij ij y y − ,  y0ij  and  y1ij denote the disposable family 
income in 1995 prices, at time t=0 and t=1, respectively, and  ) ln( ij y ∆ represents 




  and 
W
ij EDU ∆ denote changes in the level of formal education between t=0 and t=1 for 
husband (H) and wife (W), respectively. As the correlation between the spouses’ 
ages as well as the spouses’ time of residence is fairly strong, the model only 
contains the husband’s age and time of residence. The choice of using this 
information for the husband instead of the wife is that the husband is more likely 
to be the main income earner. Following common practice, AGEij is used as a 
proxy for general work-experience at t = 0, whereas YSIij represents the number of 
years that family i has resided in the host county at t = 0. In addition, we allow for 
a quadratic effect of the time of residence on the change in the family income by  
                                                 
14 This issue has been stressed and analyzed in numerous studies (see e.g. Borjas, 1985, 1987, 
1989 and LaLonde & Topel, 1992). 
15 A similar model is applied in Axelsson & Westerlund (1998) and Widerstedt (1998). 
16 Since equation (1) reflects two separate income equations and each one, by tradition, has a semi-
log functional form, the change in the depended variable (income) in equation (1) is, thus, 
expressed as the difference between the logarithms of the income variables. Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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including the variable 
2 ) ( j ij YSI YSI − , where  j YSI  denotes the average value in 
the sample of immigrant families (husbands) originating from j. This construction 
makes it possible to avoid multicollinearity, which can arise when  ij YSI  and its 
quadrate are used. This approach which allows for nonlinearities is also used for 
the variable AGE. Further, Mij is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if 
family i moves from one location (LA-region) to another at any time between t=0 
and t=1 and zero otherwise.  ij ε is a normally distributed error term. 
In the formulation of equation (1), the change in income due to the family’s 
internal migration is captured by the parameter  j α , and its variation with time in 
the host country is captured by the parameters  j 1 µ  and  j 2 µ . The model also 
controls for other sources of income changes. Change due to: the spouses’ host 
country-specific human capital investments (such as learning the host country’s 
language) are captured by  j 1 θ  and  j 2 θ ;
17 investments in the spouses’ formal 
education are captured by 
H
j β  and 
W
j β ; and aging is captured by  j 1 τ  and  j 2 τ . 
Moreover, potential changes in family income resulting from economy-wide 
changes between 1995 and 2000, i.e. the so-called period-effect, are captured by 
the intercept  j γ . Note that the unobserved time-invariant family-specific and 
cohort-specific fixed effects in the intercept are cancelled out.  
Two other control variables are also included. Changes in the number of 
children living at home are represented by  ij CHILD ∆ . Moreover, there is reason 
to believe that the amount of potential growth in family income differs depending 
on the family’s initial income level, i.e. in 1995; the higher the initial income, the 
lower may be the growth.  j κ  and  j δ  are associated parameters. Note also that, 
with the exception of migration, the effects of all other variables are assumed to 
be the same within group j for both migrant and non-migrant families. 
In accordance with the discussion in section 2, internal migration increases 
the family income if  0 > j α , and this effect decreases with increasing length of 
residence time in the host country if  0 1 < j µ . Potential nonlinearities in the 
                                                 
17 This approach is common in the immigration research (see Chiswick, 1978). Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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relationship between the monetary outcome of internal migration and the time of 
residence in the host country are captured by the parameter  j 2 µ . Furthermore, we 
may expect that these effects differ between immigrant groups in accordance with 
geographical and cultural distance between Sweden and the country of origin. 
 
Estimation Method 
A potential, and a quite common, problem with this type of analysis is that the 
migration decision and the income difference in equation (1) may be determined 
simultaneously. The reason is that expected income differences associated with 
mobility may affect the decision of whether to move or stay. Consequently, the 
indicator of migration is not necessarily uncorrelated with the error term in 
equation (1). Therefore, direct estimation of equation (1) may provide biased 
parameter estimates. A widely applied approach to solve this problem is to use the 
instrumental variables method. This enables a predictor for observed migratory 
status among families to be created (see Greene, 2003). I do this by estimating a 
logit model, where the dependent variable equals unity if family i migrates and 
zero otherwise. The predicted probability of a positive outcome, i.e. migration, 
replaces the migration dummy variable (M) in the income change equation, 
equation (1). The income change equation is then estimated using Nonlinear Least 
Squares. 
To create the predictor of family migratory status, a migration decision 
model is used, which takes the following form 
 
ij j ij ij Z M η + = λ
*  (2) 
where 
   1 = ij M if  0
* > ij M  
    0 = ij M if  0
* ≤ ij M  
*
ij M represents the propensity of family i originating from j to migrate, which is 
latent, and Mij  is the observable migration decision. Zij denotes a set of Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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explanatory variables, which include family and spouses’ personal characteristics 
as well as regional attributes (discussed below).  j λ  is a vector of associated 
parameters, and  ij η  is the random error term.  
A large empirical literature (see Greenwood, 1975, 1997 for a survey) 
attempts to verify which variables best predict the migration decision. The 
migration probability is expected to decrease with age as the period over which 
the returns accruing from migration can be reaped will be shorter. Education is 
expected to have a positive effect on migration partly because more highly 
educated people may be more efficient at gathering information on alternative 
regions, and partly because it is possible that the skills of highly educated people 
are more transferable between regions than those of people with a low level of 
education. According to the discussion in Section 2, we may expect that the 
migration probability decreases with the length of residence time in Sweden 
(YSI).
18 It is evident in several studies (see e.g. Holmlund, 1984) that those in 
employment have a lower propensity to migrate than those who are unemployed. 
Since family migration has to consider both spouses’ employment opportunities, 
we may expect that the spouses’ employment status (EMP) decreases the family 
migration probability (see Mincer, 1978).
19 In terms of the number of children 
(CHILD), especially school-age children, the family size is also likely to reduce 
the migration probability (see Long, 1974 and Mincer, 1978).  
Note that these attributes are also used as explanatory variables in the 
income change equation. By not incorporating additional variables in the 
migration part of the model, an identification problem may arise. Hence, I include 
several regional attributes that could explain the migration decision. One indicator 
of the level of labor market activity in the region of origin (i.e. the region of 
residence in 1995 in our case) is the number of unemployed per vacancy (U/V). It 
is  thought  to  reflect  the  demand  for  labor  in  the  regional  market. In densely 
                                                 
18 As noted before, YSI may also capture potential cohort-effects. Unfortunately, identification of 
these two effects is not possible as the migration decision equation is estimated by using cross-
sectional data from one single year (i.e. 1995, in our case). Nevertheless, YSI may account for the 
combined effects of residence time and cohort on the migration decision.  
19 Although we consider the spouses’ employment status that precedes migration, we cannot fully 
exclude the probability that this variable is still endogenous.  Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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populated regions, the opportunity to find a good match, i.e. the right job with the 
right wage is presumably higher than in sparsely populated regions. Thus, the size 
of the population (POP) in the region of residence is expected to have a negative 
effect on family migration.
20 
It is likely that inhabitants in certain regions experience higher mobility 
turnover than inhabitants in other regions. This may be due to unobservable 
regional attributes, such as the environment or geographical location. These 
regional attributes will be considered through the variable (MOVDEN) measuring 
the share of gross migration, i.e. the percentage of people migrating out of and 
into region j.
21 Thus, a family that lives in a region where the gross mobility is 
relatively high is expected to be more likely to migrate than otherwise. Finally, as 
noted in the introduction, several studies find that immigrants are attracted to 
regions with a high density of immigrants from a similar origin as well as other 
immigrants. Accordingly, the density of other immigrants (IMDEN) and the 
density of immigrants from the same world region (ETHDEN) in the originating 
region of residence are expected to be negatively correlated to family migration.  
The results of the estimation of equation (2) are reported in Table A1 in the 
appendix. As expected, the results indicate that the length of residence time 
affects the families’ propensity to migrate in a negative way; immigrant families 
tend to move a relatively short time after arrival, but with time, their propensity to 
migrate declines. This effect is more apparent for refugee-immigrants and Asian-
immigrants.  It is important to keep in mind that the effect of residence time may 
be over- or underestimated as potential cohort-effects are not identified. 
The table also shows that the effects of all regional attributes on family 
migration are significant and have the anticipated signs only for refugee-
immigrants. For European-immigrants, the effects of both (IMDEN) and (POP) 
are significant, whereas only (POP)  is significant for the remaining groups. 
However, a Wald-test indicates that the linear combination of the coefficients for 
the regional attributes used in the study is significant for all the immigrant groups, 
                                                 
20 See e.g. Axelsson & Westerlund (1998) for similar treatment. 
21 Another variable of interest is the occurrence of earlier (internal) migration; a person who 
migrates once may be more likely to migrate again than a person with no previous experience of 
migration. Unfortunately, we lack such information in our data.  Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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except for Asian-immigrants. For this group, only the linear combination of the 
coefficients for (POP) and (IMDEN) is significant.  
The estimation results, reported in Table A1, are used to calculate the 
predicted probability of family migration according to the following formulation: 
)] ˆ exp( 1 /[ ) ˆ exp( j ij j ij
PV
ij Z Z M λ λ + = , where λ ˆ  denotes the estimated parameters. 
PV
ij M  will be inserted in the income change equation, equation (1), and serves as 
an instrument for family migration.  
 
4 ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
Table 3 contains the results from the instrumental variables (IV) estimation of the 
income change equation, equation (1), for different immigrant groups. For 
purposes of comparison, we also include the NLSQ estimates when the migration 
variable is treated as exogenous in the income change equation. As can be seen in 
the table (row 2), the effect of migration on refugee-immigrant families’ income 
change is positive and significant. This indicates that the total income grows 
relatively faster for migrant families than for otherwise similar non-migrant 
families. Further, the table shows (row 3) that the effect of the interaction between 
migration and residence time is negative and significant, indicating that the 
monetary gain from internal migration decreases as the time of residence in the 
host country increases. The table (row 4) also indicates that the monetary outcome 
of migration decreases with time of residence at a decreasing rate, since the 
coefficient corresponding to the quadratic term is significantly positive. These 
results are also confirmed by a Wald-test for joint significance of  j j 1 .µ α  and 
j j 2 .µ α . The table also shows that the effect of migration is positive for Asian-
immigrants and negative for immigrant families from the Nordic countries and 
from Europe. However, these effects are not significant at conventional levels, 
implying that we cannot reject that the income growth is the same for both 
migrant and non-migrant families among these groups. Further, the effect of the 
time of residence is not significant for these groups.  
 Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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Table 3  Parameter estimates in the income chance equation (s.e. within 
parentheses). 
Variable Nordic  Europe  Asia  Refugee 
  NLSQ IV    IV  NLSQ  IV  NLSQ  IV 
Constant  0,65* 0,66*  0,69* 0,67*  0,60*  0,53*  0,76*  0,73* 
  (0,02) (0,02)  (0,03) (0,03)  (0,07) (0,08) (0,01) (0,014) 
M (α )  -0,013 -0,27  NLSQ  -0,21 0,10  0,08  0,03*  0,23* 
  (0,03) (0,28)  (0,06) (0,33)  (0,9) (0,20)  (0,01)  (0,023) 
YSI ( 1 µ )
  0,29 0,28  0,08 0,48  0,04  0,07  -0,33*  -0,35* 
  (0,86) (0,32)  (0,13) (0,80)  (0,10) (0,45) (0,08) (0,037) 
2 ) ( YSI YSI − ( 2 µ )
  -0,03 -0,003  -0,006  0,03  -0,02  0,12 0,013*  0,013* 
  (0,08) (0,002)  (0,005)  (0,04)  (0,01) (0,031)  (0,005)  (0,003) 
YSI ( 1 θ )
  0,001* 0,001*  -0,0007 0,001  0,003*  0,004** 0,0015* 0,005* 
  (0,0003) (0,0005)  (0,0006) (0,001)  (0,002) (0,002) (0,0004)  (0,0005) 
2 ) YSI YSI ( − /100( 2 θ ) 0,007* 0,007*  0,01*  0,01*  -0,001 -0,01  0,01*  -0,01* 
 (0,002)  (0,003)  (0,005)  (0,007)  (0,02) (0,02) (0,003)  (0,004) 
AGE
  -0,009* -0,008*  -0,005* -0,005*  0.0004 0,001  -0,004*  -0,004*
  (0,0004) (0,0004)  (0,0007) (0,0007)  (0,002) (0,002) (0,0003)  (0,0003) 
2 ) AGE (AGE− /100  -0,052* -0,048*  -0,035* -0,04*  0,003  0,004  -0,04*  -0,04* 
  (0,004) (0,004)  (0,006) (0,006)  (0,01) (0,01) (0,003)  (0,003) 
H EDU   ∆   -0,001 0,0007 0,0006  0,0007  -0,01*  -0,01*  -0,002  -0,001 
  (0,002) (0,002)  (0,003) (0,003)  (0,004) (0,004) (0,001) (0,001) 
W EDU   ∆   0,02* 0,021*  0,009*  0,009* 0,007** 0,007** 0,002  0,002 
  (0,002) (0,002)  (0,003) (0,003)  (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) 
CHILD   ∆   0,13* 0,13*  0,11* 0,11*  0,07*  0,07*  0,067*  0,069* 
  (0,003) (0,003)  (0,007) (0,007)  (0,01) (0,01) (0,003)  (0,003) 
yt-1 (1995)  -0,016* -0,02*  -0,03*  -0,03*  -0,06* -0,06* -0,06* -0,06* 
  (0,0009) (0,0009)  (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,004) (0,004) (0,001) (0,001) 
Adj. R
2  0,15 0,16  0,10 0,11  0,11  0,12  0,19  0,20 
N.Obs.  16 229  8 685  3 277  32 132 
Note: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 10 percent. The estimations are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. AGE and YSI refer to the husband. The dependent variable is measured as the change in 
the logarithm of the family disposable income between 1995 and 2000. 
 
 
Using the alternative consumer price index that recognizes differences in 
housing prices between regions, the results (reported in Table A2) indicate the 
same pattern, i.e. migration has a positive, but with time declining, effect on 
family income growth only in the case of refugee-immigrants. However, the 
outcome, when it is significant, seems to be smaller than in the former case, which Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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indicates that immigrants migrate to regions where the “consumer prices” are 
relatively high.  
Turning to the influences of the other variables, investments in additional 
formal education among immigrant wives appear to increase their earnings and, 
thus, the income of the family. In contrast, the husbands’ educational investments 
do not seem to have a similar effect on family income growth. However, these 
conclusions do not apply to refugee-immigrant wives as the effect in their cases is 
insignificant. Asian husbands also constitute an exception because the effect of 
their educational investments on family income is, surprisingly, negative. 
Despite differences between immigrant groups, the change in the number of 
children living at home appears to have positive and significant influence on the 
change in family income. A possible explanation is that the spouse with the 
highest earnings increases his/her labor supply, which may, along with child-
related allowances exceed the loss in income caused by parental leave. As 
expected, the results indicate that the rate of growth in family income declines as 
the level of initial income, i.e. the income in 1995, increases. Finally, in general, 
family income growth seems to increase with the length of residence in Sweden, 
whereas it appears to decrease with increasing age (of the husband).  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines whether internal migration among newly arrived immigrant 
families affects their total annual disposable income. Immigrants are defined as 
foreign-born people living in Sweden both on 31
st December 1995 and 2000. Four 
immigrant groups are defined; Nordic, European, Asian and immigrants who 
originate from the main refugee-dispatching countries (“refugee-immigrants”). 
Families are defined as married/ cohabitant husband-wife families, who are non-
divorced/non-separated during the period 1995 to 2000. Migrants are defined as 
families who during the period 1996-1999 migrated from one LA-region to 
another. The analysis is based on the LOUISE-database, complemented with data 
on internal migration.  Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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The empirical findings indicate that refugee-immigrant families who 
migrate internally a relatively short time after their arrival achieve a higher family 
income in comparison with both otherwise similar families who do not migrate 
and families who move after having lived in the host country for a longer time. 
Thus, we may conclude that internal migration generates positive effects on the 
income of recently arrived refugee-immigrant families. We could not find, on the 
other hand, similar results for immigrant families from other (world) regions. 
Note that our results seem robust with respect to the estimation method and the 
way in which we measure the price level. 
One possible explanation is that immigrants from the Nordic countries, 
Europe and even Asia have the opportunity to gather pre-immigration information 
about the country of destination e.g. by visiting the country before they decide to 
immigrate, and this, in turn, may increase their chances of finding a reasonably 
good match for their skills upon arrival. In contrast, refugee-immigrants, for 
political reasons, may lack such an opportunity and, thus, end up in places where 
their skills do not match the demand for skills. Another explanation may be 
related to the limited opportunities that refugee-immigrants have when they 
choose the initial place of residence. Even though the “whole of Sweden strategy” 
officially ended in 1989 (see section 2), the supply of housing still plays a major 
roll in refugee-immigrants’ choice of initial place to live.
22 For example, the 
metropolitan areas, where the opportunity to find a good skills match is likely to 
be greater than in other areas, are often not an option for newly arrived refugees 
when there is a housing scarcity. As a result, from the perspective of skill 
matching, recently arrived refugee-immigrants are likely to live in the “wrong” 
regions, and, thus, internal migration remains as a possible means to finding a 
better one. 
                                                 
22 See The Integration Board (2003). Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1  Logit estimates of the (binary choice) migration decision equation 
(s.e. within parentheses). 
Variable Nordic    Europe  Asia  Refugee 
Constant  0,55 4,9*  7,9*  5,56* 
  (0,85) (0,93)  (1,0)  (0,26) 
YSI
  -0,03* -0,04*  -0,046*  -0,052* 
  (0,008) (0,009)  (0,02)  (0,005) 
2 ) ( YSI YSI − /100  0,13* 0,12*  -0,6*  -0,16* 
 (0,05)  (0,06)  (0,3)  (0,05) 
AGE
  -0,01 -0,026*  -0,045*  0,028* 
  (0,01) (0,011)  (0,013)  (0,003) 
2 ) AGE (AGE− /100  0,02 0,07  -0,02  0,07* 
  (0,08) (0,08)  (0,10)  (0,03) 
EMP
H  -0,71* -0,42*  -0,55*  -0,57* 
  (0,12) (0,15)  (0,17)  (0,056) 
EMP
W  0,59* -0,59*  0,48*  -0,54* 
  (0,11) (0,14)  (0,17)  (0,07) 
EDU
H  (secondary)  0,23 0,06  0,08  0,10* 
  (0,18) (0,19)  (0,32)  (0,05) 
(post-secondary  < 2 years)  0,68* 0,27  -0,23  0,03 
  (0,20) (0,24)  (0,36)  (0,07) 
(post-secondary ≥2 years or more)  0,92* 0,13  0,71*  0,32* 
  (0,21) (0,22)  (0,27)  (0,07) 
EDU
W  (secondary)  -0,54* 0,09 -0,12  0,0002 
  (0,25) (0,19)  (0,29)  (0,054) 
(post-secondary  < 2 years)  0,19 0,04  -0,31  0,08 
  (0,19) (0,23)  (0,35)  (0,08) 
(post-secondary ≥2 years or more)  -0,017 0,49*  0,57*  0,19* 
  (0,23) (0,21)  (0,29)  (0,09) 
CHILD   -0,11** -0,17*  -0,16*  0,06* 
  (0,06) (0,08)  (0,07)  (0,016) 
U/V  0,18 -0,17  0,15  0,49* 
  (0,16) (0,20)  (0,21)  (0,06) 
MOVDEN  1,5 -1,6  1,6  3,8* 
  (5,1) (6,1)  (9,0)  (1,9) 
POP  -0,21* -0,50*  -0,55*  -0,50* 
  (0,06) (0,07)  (0,11)  (0,02) 
IMDEN  -0,58 8,2*  -5,9  -3,7* 
  (2,4) (3,5)  (3,77)  (1,09) 
ETHDEN  -2,3 -63,0*  -45,9  -18,0* 
  (2,7) (15,0)  (38,3)  (3,1) 
Pseudo R
2  0,08 0,12  0,20  0,23 
N-OBS.  16 229  8 685  3 277  32 132 
Note: * significant at 5% and ** significant at 10%. AGE and YSI refer to the husband.  Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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Table A2  Parameter estimates of the income change equation (s.e. within parentheses).  
Variable Nordic    Europe  Asia  Refugee 
Constant  0,55* 0,60* 0,42* 0,64* 
  (0,02) (0,03) (0,08) (0,014) 
M (α )  -0,05 0,006 0,12  0,16* 
  (0,28) (0,33) (0,20) (0,023) 
YSI ( 1 µ )
  0,35 -11,5  0,12 -0,36* 
  (2,3) (9,3) (0,39)  (0,056) 
2 ) ( YSI YSI − ( 2 µ )
  -0,02  0,86 0,09 0,023* 
  (0,11) (0,92) (0,17) (0,003) 
YSI ( 1 θ )
  0,0008*  0,0005 0,004* 0,002* 
  (0,0005) (0,0008) (0,002)  (0,0005) 
2 ) ( YSI YSI − ( 2 θ )/100  0,006** 0,003  -0,01  -0,01* 
  (0,003) (0,006) (0,02)  (0,004) 
AGE
  -0,008* -0,005* 0,001  -0,004* 
  (0,0004) (0,0007) (0,002)  (0,0003) 
2 ) AGE (AGE− /100  -0,05* -0,03* -0,006 -0,04* 
  (0,004) (0,006) (0,01)  (0,003) 
H EDU   ∆   0,0009  -0,0003 -0,08** -0,001 
  (0,002) (0,003) (0,004) (0,001) 
W EDU   ∆   0,02* 0,008*  0,006 0,001 
  (0,002) (0,003) (0,004) (0,001) 
CHILD   ∆   0,13* 0,11* 0,07* 0,07* 
  (0,003) (0,008) (0,01)  (0,003) 
yt-1 (1995)  -0,02* -0,03* -0,06* -0,06* 
  (0,0009)  (0,002) (0,004) (0,001) 
Adj. R
2  0,15 0,11 0,12 0,18 
N.Obs.  16 229  8 685  3 277  32 132 
Note: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 10 percent. The estimations are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. AGE and YSI refers to the husband. The dependent variable is measured as the change in 
the logarithm of the family disposable income between 1995 and 2000. Internal migration and income of immigrant families 
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